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INTRODUCTION
Scholarly and popular critiques of contemporary free speech juris-
prudence have noted an attitude of unquestioning deference to the
political power of money. Rather than sheltering the ability to speak
truth to power, they have lamented, the contemporary First
Amendment shelters power’s ability to make and propagate its own
truth. This Article relates developments in recent First Amendment
jurisprudence to a larger struggle now underway to shape the
distribution of information power in the era of informational capital-
ism. In particular, it argues that cases about political speech—cases
that lie at the First Amendment’s traditional core—tell only a small
part of the story. The contemporary First Amendment must be
situated within a larger story about the realignment of information
flows within circuits of power that serve emerging global interests,
and to tell that story, one must look to disputes about the speech
implications of private economic regulation. As a result of that
struggle, free speech jurisprudence about information rights and
harms is becoming what is best described as a zombie free speech
jurisprudence: a body of doctrine robbed of its animating spirit of
expressive equality and enslaved in the service of economic power.1
Within the emerging zombie free speech jurisprudence, speech,
money, and information processing are equivalent, and speech
advancing economic interests receives the strongest protection of all.
Part I discusses a group of seemingly disparate cases about the
contours of the contemporary First Amendment, identifying two
common themes. First, the cases construct a broad equivalence
between speech and money that is heavily influenced by notions of
information as property or otherwise proprietary. Second, the idea
of information as property or otherwise proprietary supports actions
defining flows of unauthorized speech as contraband. Part II argues
that First Amendment decisions do not create distributional inequit-
ies in information power; they are symptoms of it. It explores the
genealogy of the contemporary crop of free speech zombies, tracing
1. See generally KYLE WILLIAM BISHOP, AMERICAN ZOMBIE GOTHIC: THE RISE AND FALL
(AND RISE) OF THE WALKING DEAD IN POPULAR CULTURE 47-59 (2010); COLIN DAYAN, THE LAW
IS A WHITE DOG: HOW LEGAL RITUALS MAKE AND UNMAKE PERSONS 21-22 (2011).
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their origins to deeper realignments in the legal regimes that more
directly constitute and reinforce private economic power. First
Amendment jurisprudence has yet to acknowledge these realign-
ments, and that failure of recognition is both intellectual and moral.
Even so, the First Amendment cannot serve as law’s primary tool
for rebalancing freedom of expression in the information age.
I. ATTACK OF THE FREE SPEECH ZOMBIES
For the last decade or so, scholars of information and technology
law have been puzzling over an unusual set of First Amendment
decisions. Those decisions include Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan v.
Holder, both of which rejected challenges to legislative expansions
of copyright protection, and Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., which struck
down a Vermont law restricting use of information about physicians’
prescribing behavior for marketing purposes.2 Critics of Eldred and
Golan have characterized those decisions as examples of a perni-
cious “copyright exceptionalism” within free speech jurisprudence
that operates to insulate copyright legislation almost entirely from
constitutional challenge.3 Meanwhile, information privacy scholars
identify a different kind of exceptionalism at work in Sorrell’s analy-
sis of the threshold conditions for strict scrutiny, and worry that
Sorrell signals trouble ahead both for efforts to strengthen privacy
protection and more generally for the regulatory state’s ability to
address information harms.4
2. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653
(2011); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
3. Christina Bohannon, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
1083, 1115 (2010); see Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades,
Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831 (2010); see also Alan E. Garfield,
The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1169, 1177
(2007) (reacting similarly to Eldred from a First Amendment scholar’s perspective). But see
Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright After Golan v. Holder,
60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1086-87 (2013) (arguing that the two cases “bring the First
Amendment to bear on copyright law much as courts have done in applying definitional balan-
cing to the laws of defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, privacy, trademark,
and other statutory and common law causes of action”).
4. See NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY (2015); Neil M. Richards, Why Data
Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2015); see also Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV.
855, 868 (2012) (reacting similarly to Sorrell from a First Amendment scholar’s perspective).
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I think that the diagnosis of the likely consequences of Eldred,
Golan, and Sorrell is right but that the charge of exceptionalism is
probably wrong. Copyright’s free speech jurisprudence and the
emerging free speech jurisprudence of targeted marketing are part
of a broader realignment in free speech jurisprudence, in which the
First Amendment’s traditional concern with political self-determina-
tion plays very little role. Instead, the decisions are infused with the
neoliberal tropes of economic liberty and consumerist participation,
and the label “speech” has become a fig leaf strategically deployed
to denote and legitimize proprietary claims over the patterns of
information flow. That process is producing a zombie free speech
jurisprudence, in which the identification of protected speech
interests conforms mindlessly to patterns of underlying entitlement,
and through which the object of protection is altered almost beyond
recognition.
A. Speech Interests Follow Ownership of the Means of
Communication
It is useful to begin in traditional First Amendment territory, by
briefly considering the Court’s cases on political speech and media
ownership as harbingers of realignment in free speech jurispru-
dence. The most prominent of the recent cases is Citizens United v.
FEC, in which a majority of the Court struck down a provision of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that prohibited corpora-
tions and unions from using their general treasury funds for inde-
pendent expenditures supporting or opposing political candidates for
federal government office.5 The Citizens United decision has been
analyzed at length by others far more expert in the intricacies of
First Amendment doctrine. For my purposes, two aspects of the
decision are worth remarking: the majority’s invocation of media
companies as stand-ins for the rights of corporations generally, and
its refusal to countenance the possibility of a constitutionally sup-
portable distinction between electioneering statements and other
types of expression.
5. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2002)).
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The aspect of the Citizens United decision that has sparked the
most popular controversy is the majority’s characterization of
corporations and other fictional persons as speakers entitled to
constitutional protection. For many scholarly commentators, how-
ever, that result was clearly presaged by earlier cases.6 In particu-
lar, the Court’s decisions about media ownership and access reveal
a consistent tradition of treating owners of capital as the bearers of
First Amendment interests.7 
Even so, the discussion of the rights of corporate speakers is
noteworthy for its focus on the rights of media companies, which
were exempted from the independent expenditure ban. For the
majority that exemption, intended to save the independent expendi-
ture restrictions from the risk of unconstitutionality, proved too
much: media companies are in the business of using their money to
fund speech, but other companies also had a constitutional right to
do so.8 At the same time, however, the majority opinion observed
that media companies are the paradigmatic corporate bearers of free
speech rights:
There is simply no support for the view that the First Amend-
ment, as originally understood, would permit the suppression of
political speech by media corporations. The Framers may not
have anticipated modern business and media corporations. Yet
television networks and major newspapers owned by media
corporations have become the most important means of mass
communications in modern times.9
That way of thinking about the special status of media companies,
though, conflates two different First Amendment freedoms. If media
companies have a special place in the constitutional firmament, it
6. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, An Initial Take on Citizens United, BALKINIZATION (Jan.
21, 2010, 12:08 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/01/initial-take-on-citizens-united.html
[http://perma.cc/87HT-SSU9]; Nate Persily, Citizens United: A Preview to a Post-Mortem,
BALKINIZATION (Jan. 21, 2010, 8:04 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/01/citizens-united-
preview-to-post-mortem_21.html [http://perma.cc/5F9K-VGPA].
7. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 747 (1996)
(plurality opinion); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994); Miami Herald
Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387
(1969).
8. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352-53.
9. Id. at 353 (citation omitted).
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is because as a group they operate platforms for expression that
enable a diverse variety of speakers to fulfill the First Amendment’s
promise of a robust marketplace of ideas. By performing what Neil
Netanel in a related context has called a structural function, they
operationalize the guarantee of freedom of the press.10 The Court’s
misperception of this point has deep roots. In the line of cases
upholding the FCC’s imposition of rules intended to create room
within the mid-twentieth-century broadcasting ecology for opposing
viewpoints, the FCC argued that control of the means of communi-
cation would enable owners of mass media organs to determine
what sorts of speech to allow.11 According to the FCC, in other
words, the problem was precisely that control of the means of
communication and capacity for constitutionally protected speech
are distinct, necessitating various corrective measures to minimize
the influence of the former on the latter.12 The Court, however,
treated the media companies as speakers in their own right, subject
to limitations justified for reasons of scarcity, not for reasons of
control.13 In doing so, it lumped speech and press freedoms together,
with potentially deleterious consequences for the exercise of both.
That result is old news now; what is interesting is the way that
Citizens United reaffirms it. The invocation of media companies as
the paradigmatic example of corporate freedom of speech signals
that the ultimate touchstone of expressive freedom is ownership of
the means of communication. One who owns resources has the
means to speak; one who owns the means of communication may
speak most fully and completely.
10. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 347-63 (1996). See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for
the Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012). By this
I intend no comment on the debate about whether the press as an institution actually should
receive special First Amendment consideration. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Independent
Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2007); Sonja
R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729 (2014). At minimum, it seems important
to ask whether, in this age of hyperpartisanship, media companies as a group actually do
function to operationalize press freedoms or whether they function solely and more simply as
speakers in their own right.
11. See FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); Red Lion, 395
U.S. at 375-77; see also In re Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). 
12. See In re Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. at 1251-55.
13. See Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 795-800; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375-
77.
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The Court had the opportunity to avoid ruling on the constitution-
ality of the independent expenditure ban on the ground that the
speech at issue, a full length documentary film available only via
video on demand, was meaningfully different than the sort of speech
with which the federal election laws are concerned.14 It declined to
do so, reasoning that it would be too dangerous to involve the courts
in determining what is favored speech.15 As others have noted, that
conclusion in turn rests on the more general and highly dubious
proposition that spending and speaking are so closely entwined that
regulation of one is equivalent to regulation of the other, whatever
the context.16 Facially, the Citizens United majority’s adoption of
both positions exemplifies the traditional preference for avoiding
slippery slopes in free speech cases. But both the lumping of infor-
mation flows and the underlying lumping of spending with speaking
are symptoms of a deeper methodological problem in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence that demands more careful consideration. In the
information era, refusal to distinguish among kinds of information
flow and among the roles that different entities play in facilitating
it spells trouble. Digital conduct—whether by individuals or by for-
profit corporations—can cause extraordinary harm and entrench
extraordinary privilege. Such conduct is informational in character,
originating as bits and moving via information networks. If every
regulation of information flows must survive First Amendment
scrutiny, meaningful governance becomes increasingly difficult—
and, paradoxically, so does meaningful protection of expressive
liberty.17
At a moment in history when information power has become
paramount, Citizens United conflated speech rights with ownership
of the means of communication and demonstrated an ordinary but
pernicious analytical reductionism about speech and speaking. As
we will see in the balance of this Section, refusal to examine the
14. See also Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case,
123 YALE L.J. 412 (2013) (arguing that in producing and disseminating the film, Citizens
United was exercising its constitutionally protected right to freedom of the press and that the
Court should have decided the case on that ground).
15. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322-27 (2010).
16. See Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2011);
McConnell, supra note 14, at 447-49.
17. See generally Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under
the Regulatory State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541 (2008).
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connections between information and power has allowed different
kinds of distinctions to creep into the case law largely unacknowl-
edged. For propertarian and statist reasons, it has suited the Court
to accept that money, information processing, and speech are all
simply interchangeable pieces in the same game.
B. Speech Is Property
If expressive freedom accrues as a function of ownership of the
means of communication, is the converse also true? Is speech
property, and if so, what consequences flow from that characteriza-
tion? Legal disputes about intellectual property supply answers to
those questions. Such disputes increasingly involve First Amend-
ment issues, and both First Amendment challenges to copyright
legislation and First Amendment defenses to copyright and para-
copyright claims fail almost all the time. Eldred v. Ashcroft and
Golan v. Holder explain why, holding that laws retrospectively
extending copyright terms and resurrecting lapsed foreign copy-
rights from the public domain required no special free speech
scrutiny because there is no right to make other people’s speeches.18
In other words, claims about the speech-restrictive effects of
copyright-related legislation fail because the subject matter of the
speech is someone else’s property. That result is sensible, the Court
explained, because copyright itself performs a First Amendment
function, incentivizing participation in the marketplace of ideas.19
Property rights are not absolute, of course, and neither are
copyrights. In particular, as the Eldred and Golan majority opinions
explained, the idea-expression distinction excludes certain subject
matters from the scope of copyright protection and the fair use
doctrine creates a privilege to use copyright-protected material in
certain circumstances.20 The Court refused, however, to look beyond
copyright’s internal limitations to consider the broader structural
18. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221
(2003).
19. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (citing Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546, 558 (1985)); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (citing Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 558).
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107 (2012); see Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889-90; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-
20.
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effects of legislation expanding the proprietary footprint of the
copyright regime. Instead, it adopted a posture of deference, ruling
that Congress has nearly unlimited leeway to legislate on copyrights
and copyright-related matters as long as it leaves copyright’s
“traditional contours” undisturbed.21 And because copyright itself
performs a First Amendment function, courts considering infringe-
ment claims brought by private litigants rarely will be justified in
invoking the First Amendment to shelter conduct that fair use does
not reach.22 To the contrary, because the bearer of free speech rights
has the right not to speak, rightholders are doubly justified in
blocking undesired uses of their works.23
There are two problems here. First, as many have remarked, aud-
iences have speech interests too. From the perspective of copyright
policy, the fiction of a public domain of unprotected, precopyright
building blocks ignores the way people interact with culture, and
the fair use doctrine does not cure this problem because it does not
effectively counterbalance the broad control of derivative works that
copyright law gives to rightholders.24 From the perspective of speech
policy, copying can serve valuable expressive purposes.25 Speech
interests also can be affected adversely by large structural changes,
such as the creation of paracopyright entitlements that impede user
access to creative works or changes to copyright duration designed
to slow passage into the public domain of important pieces of our
common cultural heritage.26
21. Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 889-90; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. For an approving view of this
conclusion, see Tun-Jen Chiang, Rehabilitating the Property Theory of Copyright’s First
Amendment Exemption, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521 (2013).
22. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.,
902 F.2d 829, 849 (11th Cir. 1990); New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873
F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir.
1978). But see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (11th Cir. 2001)
(giving separate and independent weight to First Amendment concerns militating against
grant of preliminary injunction in fair use dispute).
23. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559.
24. See JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY
OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 74-79 (2012); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification, and
Culture: Locating the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 121, 157-64
(Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
25. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech
and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).
26. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (2012)); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
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The second problem brings us back by a different route to the
lumping problem raised in the previous Section. Creative works are
the subject matter of copyright, to be sure, and if for-profit corpora-
tions are First Amendment speakers then their trademarks are the
subjects of certain proprietary or quasi-proprietary rights also, but
the speech-equals-property syllogism utterly fails to describe the
nature of an intellectual property owner’s speech interest. For an
individual author, a creative work may be a personal statement, in
which case it is not simply property, but rather a result of situated
inspiration and creative practice.27 A creative work may become
simply property when the copyright is assigned to a production
intermediary such as a publisher or film production company, but
from the perspective of the intermediary, it is no longer a personal
statement to which a speech interest might attach. A trademark is
more closely analogous to a personal statement, but if so—as we will
see below—it is a reputational statement of the sort that the First
Amendment traditionally has declined to protect against critique.
If corporate intellectual property owners have speech interests,
those interests are more like those of media companies: they are
interests that flow from the ownership of capital and its provision
to fund production, cultural or otherwise. A rule privileging
copyright interests over the speech interests of nonowners, regard-
less of how the regime defining ownership might expand in length
and breadth, ignores these differences.
C. Proprietary Information Processing Is Speech
If spending on information is speaking and speech is property,
what should be the fate of attempted legal restrictions on market-
place messages? For almost two centuries, the First Amendment
was considered largely irrelevant to regulation of speech advancing
Pub. L. No. 105-298, §§ 101-102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-
304 (2012)). On the speech-inhibiting effects of these laws, see Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech
and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); and Erwin
Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright
Extension Act Is Unconstitutional, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002).
27. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 82-88; JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS,
INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 26-80 (2014).
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commercial and professional activities because such regulation was
understood to be directed fundamentally at commerce rather than
at discourse in the public sphere. That began to change in the late
twentieth century with the emergence of a line of cases that has
become known as the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence and
that concerned attempts to regulate more complex messages by
corporate and professional speakers.28 In Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, the Court purported to
advance a definitive test for assessing the validity of laws regulating
commercial speech: regulation of speech that is neither misleading
nor related to unlawful activity must advance a substantial
government interest, and must be appropriately tailored to that
interest.29 In the ensuing years, the Court seemed concerned chiefly
with fleshing out the application of Central Hudson and policing the
boundary that defined which sorts of speech qualified as commercial
speech. It resisted juxtaposing the commercial speech inquiry, which
presumed some prior act of selection of the speech to be regulated,
with the line of cases holding that laws discriminating among
speakers based on their identity or the content of their speech must
survive strict scrutiny.30
That resistance came to an end in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., in
which a majority of the Court ruled that a Vermont statute prohibit-
ing pharmaceutical companies’ use of prescriber-identifying infor-
mation for marketing purposes must survive strict scrutiny because
the restriction was both content- and speaker-based.31 Because
regimes of commercial speech regulation typically begin with some
definition of scope that involves one or both distinctions, Sorrell sug-
gests that legislatures and agencies seeking to impose regulatory
burdens on information-era commerce must proceed with caution
when drawing lines.32 That result, moreover, places regulators neat-
ly on the horns of a dilemma: broad proscriptions on information
28. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66
(1980); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
29. 447 U.S. at 561-66.
30. See, e.g., L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1999)
(declining to address the strict scrutiny question).
31. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663-66 (2011).
32. Id.
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processing seem likely to fail on narrow-tailoring grounds, but
narrowly targeted privacy protections risk being invalidated as
impermissibly discriminatory. Almost as an afterthought, the major-
ity opinion continued the practice of lumping kinds of information
flow, agreeing that constitutional protection for speech extended to
information-processing activities intended to improve the targeting
of likely prospects to whom commercial speech might be directed.33
Opponents of information privacy regulation have attempted to
paint Sorrell as an information privacy case,34 but the majority saw
it as a case about market manipulation through persuasion. The
drug detailing program at issue used information about the past
behaviors of prescribing physicians, not of patients, and the state’s
asserted interests were primarily fiscal. Because pharmaceutical
detailing is designed to increase demand for proprietary drugs, the
state feared that giving detailers carte blanche to conduct data
mining operations in the state’s prescription drug database would
drive up the cost of its Medicaid prescription drug program.35 That
fear weighed importantly in the Court’s eventual conclusion that the
privacy concerns adduced in the appellate record and in the state’s
briefs were makeweights.36 Instead, the majority framed the
Vermont law as an attempt to undermine the persuasiveness of
pharmaceutical marketers’ speech.37 So framed, the law conflicted
with the marketplace-of-ideas philosophy that animates free speech
jurisprudence: protection for persuasion lies at the core of the zone
that the First Amendment protects. 
Yet to call Sorrell a case about persuasion is to insist (again) on
both the conflation of spending and speaking and the impossibility
of making meaningful distinctions among kinds of speech-related
activities. Particularly in an era when both money and speech
33. Id. at 2666-67 (citing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), a case about an
intercepted telephone conversation; Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995), a case
about disclosures on a product label; and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion), a case about financial reports).
34. See Thomas R. Julin, Sorrell v. IMS Health May Doom Federal Do Not Track Acts, 10
Privacy & Sec. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 35 (Sept. 5, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/8LEQ-GV6G.
35. See 2007 Vt. Acts & Resolves 635; Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670-71 (discussing this aspect
of the record).
36. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668-2670; IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 276-77
(2d Cir. 2010), aff ’d, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Brief for Petitioner at 45-49, Sorrell, 131 S. Ct.
2653 (No. 10-779).
37. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2671.
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increasingly have become dematerialized, existing only as bits that
flow over the network, it may make good technical sense to classify
anything that creates meaning as speech. That result is consistent
with an understanding of information that is derived from cybernet-
ics and based on the distinction between signal and noise, but it
makes much less sense from a constitutional perspective, which is
concerned—or ought to be—with the creation of meaning.38 Detail-
ing is different from persuasion along a critical dimension that has
to do with transparency and manipulation. Its operative principle
is the nudge rather than the reasoned comparison among alterna-
tives, and its point is surplus extraction, pure and simple. Its goal
is to minimize the need to persuade by targeting directly those
potential customers most strongly predisposed to buy and appealing
to everything that is known about those customers’ habits and
predilections. With the pronouncement that operations directed at
surplus extraction are privileged as speech, the zombification of
First Amendment law takes an important additional step away from
protection for information as expression and toward protection for
information as competitive advantage.
More generally, the backward-looking lawyerly exercise of evalu-
ating new commercial speech cases for their consistency with
Central Hudson and its progeny gets the commercial speech
problem precisely wrong. Central Hudson and its ilk are better
understood as forerunners of a mature jurisprudence about the First
Amendment implications of regulatory oversight of commercial
information processing activities in the information age. The First
Amendment antiregulatory agenda that began with arguments
developed in law review articles and strategy sessions at libertarian
think tanks also has matured.39 What began as a trickle of cases
38. See CLAUDE E. SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER, THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF
COMMUNICATION 19 (1949). For two thought-provoking general critiques of the Shannon
approach and its minimalist approach to the question of meaning, see N. KATHERINE HAYLES,
HOW WE BECAME POSTHUMAN: VIRTUAL BODIES IN CYBERNETICS, LITERATURE, AND
INFORMATICS 50-83 (1999); and DAN SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT INFORMATION 3-16
(2007).
39. See SOLVEIG SINGLETON, PRIVACY AS CENSORSHIP: A SKEPTICAL VIEW OF PROPOSALS
TO REGULATE PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 295, 1998),
available at http://perma.cc/KE3A-XWKU; Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, What Unites
Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation?, PROGRESS ON POINT, Nov. 2009, available
at http://perma.cc/P2WA-3PQW; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
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raising First Amendment challenges to regulations concerning
information-related activities in regulated markets has become a
steady stream of opinions on a wide variety of subjects—food and
drug labeling requirements, disclosure requirements for securities
issuers, permissible uses of consumer information, and so on.40 From
this perspective, moreover, it is no coincidence that the Court’s
commercial speech jurisprudence has developed alongside its cases
about the free speech rights of corporations generally. Both devel-
opments reflect an economic reality in which information has
increasingly become untethered from industrial production to
become a source of value in its own right, and in which powerful
interests that profit from information-related activities have sys-
tematically resisted regulatory oversight. 
The real question posed in Sorrell was one that the majority did
not recognize: how commercial speech jurisprudence for the era of
informational capitalism ought to respond to such efforts. A signal
victory for the First Amendment antiregulatory strategy, Sorrell
portends wholesale constitutionalization of entire sectors of
commercial activity and a broad and enduring marginalization of
regulatory authority. 
D. Proprietary Information Can Be Contraband
The fourth important underpinning of the emerging zombie First
Amendment jurisprudence is Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.
There, a majority of the Court rejected a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a federal law forbidding material aid and support to
organizations classified as terrorist.41 The entity challenging the law
had provided human rights advocacy training to certain Kurdish
and Tamil dissident organizations, and feared prosecution.42
Although Humanitarian Law Project does not seem to be a case
about private economic power at all, it too is usefully read in light
of the propertarian shift in contemporary First Amendment juris-
REV. 1049 (2000).
40. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014); R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC,
358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); King v. Gen. Info. Servs., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
41. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
42. Id. at 1-2.
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prudence. So read, the case stands for the proposition that infor-
mation that is property or that represents proprietary knowledge
can become contraband and the target of interdiction mandates.43
Within the First Amendment canon, disputes about banned
speech and prohibited associations evoke the era of the civil rights
marches, the House Un-American Activities Committee, and the
demise of broadly drafted criminal syndicalism laws. Thus, for
example, David Cole has argued that Humanitarian Law Project
represents a radical break from cases like Brandenburg v. Ohio,
which allowed punishment of speech only when sufficiently linked
to direct threats of violence.44 That view seems difficult to contra-
dict, and from the perspective that Cole so ably articulates, the
decision in Humanitarian Law Project is inexplicable. And yet the
constitutional law scholar’s view of the world is sometimes preoccu-
pied with events within the stream of constitutional jurisprudence
to the exclusion of those occurring outside it. The decision in
Humanitarian Law Project reflects the influence of another, more
contemporary debate about information danger and information
contraband that one also must acknowledge. 
A new phase in the debate about information contraband and the
First Amendment began in the 1990s, amid the dawning realization
that global information and communication networks and encryp-
tion technologies permitted information to spread in an uncontrolled
and radically democratic fashion. Public fears coalesced around a set
of threats that the technorati dubbed the “Four Horsemen of the
Infocalypse”: terrorism, drug dealers, pedophiles, and organized
crime.45 The Four Horsemen represented existential threats to the
43. A useful treatment of the information contraband question, focusing primarily on the
question whether the general structure of First Amendment doctrine permits contraband
treatment, is Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and
Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2002).
44. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203, 203 (1961) (enunciating analogous rule for efforts to criminalize association); see David
Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in
First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 147-48 (2012); see also Seth F.
Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the
Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 41-55 (2006) (arguing that efforts to
regulate speech by targeting online intermediaries should consider the mid-twentieth
century’s First Amendment lessons).
45. See Javier Bernal, Big Brother Is On-Line: Public and Private Security in the Internet,
CYBERSOCIOLOGY MAG. (Aug. 6, 1999), http://www.cybersociology.com/files/6_publicandprivate
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fabric of society and the rule of law: threats in response to which
ordinary procedures might be suspended in favor of extraordinary
measures. With the articulation of these threats, the stage was set
for a shift in the legal understanding of the relationship between
speech and danger. 
The first strand of the contemporary discourse about information
contraband has explored the blurring of speech and conduct in
executable computer code. In the mid-1990s, litigants in a pair of
cases challenged the attempted assertion of federal export control
regulations to restrict Internet-based distribution of encryption
technologies, and won rulings acknowledging that human-readable
source code is speech and that even machine-readable object code
has an important expressive dimension.46 The federal courts have
been unwilling, however, to accept the further argument that laws
regulating code merit strict scrutiny. Instead, as the Sixth Circuit
explained, “[t]he functional capabilities of source code, and particu-
larly those of encryption source code, should be considered when
analyzing the governmental interest in regulating the exchange of
this form of speech.”47 To similar effect, in Universal Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, a case about code that circumvented technical protections for
copyrighted works, the court held that circumvention tools could be
regulated as conduct, subject to the same general limitations that
apply to other laws with secondary effects on speech.48
The statute challenged in Humanitarian Law Project reflects a
similar effort to define particular kinds of expertise as posing
dangers in a way that transcended the formal classification of
expert advice as speech. As the lawsuit wound its way through the
security.html [http://perma.cc/KW3Q-DNF5]. For what appears to have been the first use of
the term, see Timothy C. May, The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, in CRYPTO ANARCHY,
CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS 61, 67 (Peter Ludlow ed., 2001).
46. Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State,
922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996), aff ’d sub nom. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn and reh’g granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (1999). In
Bernstein, the planned en banc rehearing was cancelled after the Commerce Department, to
which export authority had been transferred, announced plans to amend the challenged
regulations and notified the plaintiff that it no longer considered his code to be covered.
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C 95-0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at *2, *5 n.2
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004).
47. Junger, 209 F.3d at 485 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
48. 273 F.3d 429, 434-35, 450-52 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 799 (1989)).
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courts, Congress amended the definition of “material support or
resources” to include “expert advice or assistance,” and then
amended the definition of “expert advice or assistance” to include
“advice or assistance derived from scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge.”49 Expert speech, Congress seemed to be
saying, has a kind of power that ordinary speech does not, and can
be restricted on that basis—which, both Congress and the courts
seemed to think, is a different proposition than making invidious
distinctions among kinds of speech or kinds of speakers.50 The
appellants in Humanitarian Law Project were not scientists or
engineers, and were not providing technical training in the lay
sense of that term.51 Yet in a world in which the line between speech
and computer-mediated action had become vanishingly thin, the
idea of the materiality of expert legal training could begin to seem
entirely credible.
The second strand of the contemporary discourse about speech
and existential threats concerns the copyright pirate, and the
appearance of this “fifth horseman” is in itself a development worth
remarking. Beginning in the late 1990s, members of the recording
and motion picture industries and their respective trade associa-
tions waged a systematic campaign to associate online copyright
infringement with organized crime and terrorism, and to frame
online infringement as an existential threat to society in its own
right.52 The notion that copyright infringement threatens the social
fabric in a way analogous to organized crime or terrorism is, of
course, highly debatable. As we have just seen, however, if informa-
tion is property first and foremost, the speech-related reasons for
49. For discussion of the amendments, see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S.
1, 10-13 (2010).
50. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2007)
(upholding amended statute as “not aimed at expressive conduct” and not covering “a
substantial amount of protected speech”), aff ’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
51. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 2. 
52. For work collecting and analyzing these statements, see TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED
SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE 113-25 (2007); JOHN LOGIE, PEERS,
PIRATES, AND PERSUASION: RHETORIC IN THE PEER-TO-PEER DEBATES (2006); John Logie, A
Copyright Cold War? The Polarized Rhetoric of the Peer-to-Peer Debates, FIRST MONDAY (July
2003), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1064/984 [http://perma.cc/UYD3-
LM76]. On the framing of copyright infringement as an existential threat, see Julie E. Cohen,
Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 18-19, 24-25 (2006).
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regulating with a light hand appear less salient to both Congress
and the courts. From a political perspective, moreover, the asserted
problem of “piracy” presented optics more congenial to draconian
state intervention. 
While attempts during the 1990s and 2000s to expand legally
sanctioned state surveillance of electronic communications met with
determined resistance,53 attempts to institute surveillance and
interdiction in the interest of copyright policing produced a series of
compromises among the private commercial interests involved.
These included a notice and takedown system for online service
providers and various private-sector initiatives for automated
enforcement and filtering of online content.54 Although Congress
had not yet attempted to legislate general interdiction obliga-
tions—a move that would come two years after the decision in
Humanitarian Law Project—by 2010 both Congress and the courts
clearly recognized legal and technical interdiction of information
flows offensive to proprietary interests as important resources in the
legislative toolkit.
The final strand of the contemporary discourse about information
contraband concerns state and corporate secrets. Congress enacted
the law challenged in Humanitarian Law Project in 1997, but for a
variety of reasons, including the curative amendments noted above,
the case did not reach the Court until a decade later. The Court held
oral argument in February 2010.55 In April 2010, the news broke
that WikiLeaks, a self-described open government organization, had
53. See, e.g., Sara Kehaulani Goo & Robert O’Harrow Jr., New Airline Screening System
Postponed: Controversy over Privacy Leads to CAPPS II Paring, Delay Until After Election,
WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A2; Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
June 12, 1994, at 44; Senate Rebuffs Domestic Spy Plan, WIRED (Jan. 23, 2003), http://
archive.wired.com/politics/law/news/2003/01/57386 [http://perma.cc/VE24-E5N8] (describing
congressional hearings on the government’s “Total Information Awareness” initiative).
54. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 502, 112 Stat. 2860,
2905-16 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012)); Megan Geuss, YouTube Has
Paid $1 Billion to Rights Holders via Content ID Since 2007, ARS TECHNICA, (Oct. 13, 2014,
7:53 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/10/youtube-has-paid-1-billion-to-rights-
holders-via-content-id-since-2007/ [http://perma.cc/G278-6DAR]. On the implications of
private-sector automated enforcement initiatives in copyright and other areas, see Danny
Rosenthal, Assessing Digital Preemption (and the Future of Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 576 (2011).
55. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (Nos. 08-
1498, 09-89), 2010 WL 621318.
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published a video of a 2007 attack by a U.S. military helicopter in
Baghdad that killed a number of civilians, including children, and
two Reuters employees. The episode received extensive coverage by
U.S. newspapers of record, which noted the organization’s history of
leaking hidden information about government and corporate
operations.56 WikiLeaks attracted its share of defenders, but its
critics saw a textbook case of advocacy run amok and threatening to
disrupt the orderly flows of policing and nation-building.57 A New
York Times article on WikiLeaks published only a few weeks
beforehand had quoted a Pentagon report as concluding that
information of the sort routinely published by WikiLeaks “could be
used by foreign intelligence services, terrorist groups and others to
identify vulnerabilities, plan attacks and build new devices.”58
The Court decided Humanitarian Law Project two months after
WikiLeaks published the video and two days after the New York
Times reported as front-page news that U.S. Army Specialist
Bradley Manning had been arrested on suspicion of having leaked
the information to WikiLeaks.59 At oral argument and in its briefs,
the government had asserted that expert training in human rights
advocacy could work to legitimize dangerous organizations.60 Accept-
ing that justification, the majority opinion also noted that terrorist
organizations could rely on such training to “threaten, manipulate,
and disrupt” the international legal system.61 Additionally, the
Court cautioned about the risks of “straining the United States’
56. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Video Shows U.S. Killing of Reuters Employees, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 2010, at A13; Noam Cohen & Brian Stelter, Airstrike Video Brings Attention to
Whistle-Blower Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2010, at A8; Garance Franke-Ruta, Web Site Releases
Video of Baghdad Attack That Killed 2 Journalists, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2010, 5:41 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/05/AR2010040503778.html
[http://perma.cc/RUF7-CFL8].
57. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, Warfare Through “a Soda Straw,” WALL ST. J., June 23, 2010,
at A17.
58. Stephanie Strom, Pentagon Sees a Threat from Online Muckrakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
18, 2010, at A18.
59. Elisabeth Bumiller, Army Leak Suspect Is Turned in, by Ex-Hacker, N.Y. TIMES, June
8, 2010, at A1.
60. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 55, at 42-46; Brief for the Respondents at 56,
Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (Nos. 08-1498, 09-89).
61. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 37.
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relationships with its allies and undermining cooperative efforts
between nations to prevent terrorist attacks.”62
The exercise of situating the Justices within a larger cultural
context is inevitably speculative. Even so, the Justices live in the
same world that the rest of us do. The Humanitarian Law Project
majority opinion is a product of its time, and not only because it
expresses the deference to asserted national-security imperatives
that has become the norm in the post-9/11 environment. It also
dovetails neatly with the debates about material expertise, technical
interdiction, and the viral spread of online conduct that have come
to loom so large in the public view. So read, the case establishes the
predicate for a shift away from Brandenburg and toward a far more
flexible approach to claims of speech-related danger when certain
kinds of interests are threatened.63
* * * 
Taken together, the decisions just described sketch the broad
outlines of an emerging First Amendment jurisprudence that is
surprisingly coherent, and more than a little unsettling. Citizens
United and Sorrell stand for the proposition that information flows
that advance the purposes of private property accumulation and
consumer surplus extraction may move freely with little fear of
encountering regulatory obstacles. At the same time, Humanitarian
Law Project, Eldred, and Golan are proof that some types of content
and speaker distinctions will be supported by the full force of
law—will be treated, in other words, as principled and nonarbitrary.
Together these opinions establish both a generally deregulatory
stance toward proprietary, profit-motivated uses of information and
62. Id. at 32.
63. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Some claims of speech-related danger still
receive more critical scrutiny, but they typically do not involve threats to a proprietary
interest in information. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012) (invalida-
ting a federal law criminalizing the making of false representations about one’s own receipt
of military honors); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2729 (2011) (enjoining
enforcement of a California law prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video games to
minors); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (invalidating a federal law
criminalizing the creation, possession, or sale of depictions of animal cruelty). Notably, Brown
employed strict scrutiny to invalidate a law that threatened the proprietary interests of game
developers. See 131 S. Ct. at 2738.
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the predicate for installing circuit breakers within the network to
intercept other kinds of uses that threaten proprietary interests.
Eldred, Golan, and Citizens United articulate and elevate to consti-
tutional significance a tight equivalence between speech and
property, making clear that anyone invoking speech arguments to
limit property claims confronts a heavy burden. Humanitarian Law
Project and Sorrell, meanwhile, invert long-established rules about
the evidentiary thresholds for constitutional scrutiny of speech
regulation, investing censorship of activism with national security
implications but encouraging First Amendment challenges to
regulation of private economic activity.
II. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL SETTLEMENTS: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN
THE INFORMATION ECONOMY
So far, I have argued that First Amendment scholars should pay
more systematic attention to a set of developments that only partial-
ly overlaps the territory long conceived as the First Amendment’s
traditional core. Many of those developments involve private econ-
omic activity and proprietary claims to information. In general, the
Court has resolved First Amendment claims relating to private
economic activity in a way that ratifies emerging distributions of
information power. In this respect, contemporary First Amendment
jurisprudence aligns with what scholars in a variety of fields have
identified as a more general shift toward a neoliberal governmental-
ity that emphasizes market liberties and a market-based approach
to political participation.64
Constitutional law does not itself produce the shift toward neo-
liberal governmentality. As Morton Horwitz has observed, “A
constitutional revolution can take place only when the intellectual
ground has first been prepared.”65 Horwitz was describing the New
Deal revolution in constitutional law, and more particularly the
64. See Wendy Brown, Neo-Liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 THEORY &
EVENT 1 (2003); David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2014); David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction,
610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 22 (2007); Timothy K. Kuhner, Citizens United as
Neoliberal Jurisprudence: The Resurgence of Economic Theory, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 395
(2011); Thomas Lemke, “The Birth of Bio-Politics”: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège
de France on Neo-Liberal Governmentality, 30 ECON. & SOC’Y 190 (2001). 
65. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 3 (1992).
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need to take careful note of its prehistory. As his research showed,
the development of private and commercial law during both the
antebellum period and the post-Civil War years established the
distributive backdrop against which the constitutional disputes of
the Lochner and New Deal eras were litigated. Economic regulation
was commonplace in the nineteenth century, and initially emerged
in ways that reinforced emerging patterns of industrial power, while
judges came to understand the common law instrumentally, as a
tool for promoting commerce and economic development.66 The
judicial philosophy that produced Lochner was in part a reaction to
perceived special-interest legislation that threatened property inter-
ests, but the turn toward social science methodology that progres-
sive legal thought set in motion also tended to validate existing
economic arrangements.67 Similarly, the First Amendment jurispru-
dence outlined in Part I takes its shape from an antecedent pattern
of subconstitutional settlements and justifications that reflects
perceived economic, commercial, and political imperatives.
The point I want to make here is most aptly characterized as
Hohfeldian: in the emerging information economy, the balance of
rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that characterized the
industrial economy and the regulatory frameworks put in place to
constrain it is shifting.68 The transformation now underway in our
political economy is engendering a corresponding shift in the
distribution of legal power and privilege that extends across
doctrinal boundaries and that is far more fundamental than the
subject-matter divisions that such boundaries attempt to impose. 
A. Corporate Citizens in the Marketplace
In both Citizens United and the earlier cases about the free
speech rights of media companies on which the Citizens United ma-
jority relied, the Court took as given that corporations speak in the
66. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 47-
54, 78-97, 116-26, 186-210, 218-26 (1977). 
67. See HORWITZ, supra note 65, at 208-12.
68. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). See generally Pierre Schlag, How to Do Things
with Hohfeld (Univ. of Colo. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 14-4, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/A6AV-Q8C4.
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same ways that people do and that money enhances communicative
power in a linear, additive way. Those assumptions are charmingly
old-fashioned. In the contemporary information economy, the
expressive power of capital is not additive but rather multiplicative
and synergistic. One of the principal vehicles for the expressive
power of capital is the corporate brand, and corporations rely on
their brands to engage in norm entrepreneurship on a wide range
of social, economic, and technical issues. The communicative impact
of brands is backed by both old and new forms of legal and market
privilege.
Brand-driven corporate messaging is both increasingly pervasive
and increasingly difficult to disentangle from the commercial and
social contexts in which it is embedded.69 Logos and other indicia of
corporate sponsorship adorn bodies, billboards, theaters and arenas,
and other public spaces. In addition, corporate brand owners pursue
a wide range of other branding opportunities that might yield
bottom-line benefits: product placements in films and television
shows, displays on the uniforms and equipment of professional
athletes, and so on. The modern corporation does not simply adver-
tise its wares, however. It develops a “social media presence” on
platforms like Facebook and Twitter, streaming updates to its
followers about developments that might implicate its market or
enhance its brand cachet. In addition, it develops gamified promo-
tional strategies designed to recruit individual consumers as brand
evangelists and reward them for their successes.70 These develop-
ments make the cumulative power of corporate messaging far
greater than the Court’s discussion presumed. Although speech in
the service of branding tends not to be overtly political, it reflects
69. The legal scholarship on trademark law is just beginning to grapple with this dynamic
in a more systematic way. See Mario Biagioli et al., Brand New World: Distinguishing Oneself
in the Global Flow, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 455 (2013); Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to
Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981 (2012). 
70. See generally RAJAT PAHARIA, LOYALTY 3.0: HOW BIG DATA AND GAMIFICATION ARE
REVOLUTIONIZING CUSTOMER AND EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT (2013); GABE ZICHERMANN &
JOSELIN LINDER, THE GAMIFICATION REVOLUTION: HOW LEADERS LEVERAGE GAME MECHANICS
TO CRUSH THE COMPETITION (2013). For a discussion of gamification as a surveillance strategy,
see Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn,
in THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION (Darin Barney et al. eds., forthcoming 2016).
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and reinscribes the ethos of consumerist, transactionally inflected
participation that increasingly characterizes public discourse.71
The principal source of federal protection for brands and branding
activities, the Lanham Act, is a creation of the industrial era.72 Its
enactment in 1946 marked the emergence of a nationwide industrial
economy within which the meaning of marks of origin as signifiers
of corporate reputation was no longer only local.73 Within the
framework established by the Lanham Act, the basic unit of reputa-
tion nominally remains the individual mark. Federal registration is
available only for specific marks, and causes of action for infringe-
ment must be pleaded on a mark-specific basis.74 
At the same time, case law interpreting the Lanham Act’s
“likelihood of confusion” standard has evolved steadily toward recog-
nition that in the information era, the currency of reputation is the
brand more generally. Thus, for example, infringement judgments
in cases involving knock-offs seem crafted to protect marks as
signifiers of luxury status; and the general cause of action for unfair
competition, originally intended as a catch-all, is routinely recruited
to cover a wide variety of situations that implicate brands rather
than marks.75 In disputes about the use of trademarks as search
terms, corporate interests lost some battles but won the war; search
has been pervasively monetized.76 Last but hardly least, other types
of entitlements in marks have proliferated in ways that acknowl-
71. See generally MARK ANDREJEVIC, INFOGLUT: HOW TOO MUCH INFORMATION IS
CHANGING THE WAY WE THINK AND KNOW 44-57 (2013) (describing the burgeoning field of
“sentiment analysis” and the ascendancy of the “affective fact”).
72. See Lanham Trademark Act, Pub. L. No. 489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2012)).
73. See also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (extending the personal
jurisdiction of the federal courts to encompass those whose activities established minimum
contacts with the forum state).
74. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1054, 1114 (2012).
75. See Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 104, 108-09 (2d Cir.
2000); Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1235, 1238-39 (6th Cir. 1991); Lois Sports-
wear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986). For insightful
discussions of this trend, see Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary
Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 845-59 (2010); Rebecca Tushnet, Stolen Valor and Stolen
Luxury, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
(Barton Beebe et al. eds., forthcoming).
76. See Steven Levy, Secret of Googlenomics: Data-Fueled Recipe Brews Profitability,
WIRED MAG. (May 22, 2009), http://archive.wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17-
06/nep_googlenomics [http://perma.cc/8GG8-Q9H3].
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edge and reinforce the expressive power of capital. Both rights
against dilution and tarnishment of well-known marks and the sys-
tem of trademark-based property rights in domain names work to
protect the cognitive and affective capital that brand owners have
developed.77 
The widening arc of federal trademark and unfair competition law
has produced ripple effects on the breathing room for cultural com-
mentary invoking marks and brands. Unlike the Copyright Act, the
Lanham Act does not contain an open-ended fair-use provision, so
courts considering claims involving parodies and other cultural uses
have had to improvise. Clear parodies in literary and audiovisual
works predictably escape liability, but the results in other kinds of
cases involving the invocation of brands as cultural signifiers can be
quite different, and such cases can be very costly to litigate regard-
less of the ultimate outcome.78 As Rebecca Tushnet and Deven Desai
have observed, these results are especially striking because they
depart so greatly from those that established First Amendment
principles would seem to require: they penalize efforts to contest the
persuasive force of branded speech and validate an asserted interest
in controlling reputation that the law generally rejects when
individual public figures are involved.79 Although the Supreme
Court has not yet spoken on the application of the Lanham Act to
cultural uses of marks, its 1987 decision in the “Gay Olympics” case
allowed a proprietary claim to overcome an expressive one.80 
77. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104-98 § 3, 109 Stat. 985, 985-86 (1996)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012)); Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002, 113 Stat. 1501 app. I, at 1501A-545 to -552 (1999) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012)).
78. See, e.g., Hershey Co. v. Friends of Steve Hershey, No. WDQ-14-1825, 2014 WL
3571691, at *1-5 (D. Md. July 17, 2014) (finding likelihood of confusion when politician named
Hershey used chocolate brown signs and white Impact or Helvetica Nueue font on election
signs); Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 WL
1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (granting summary judgment on luggage manufacturer’s
dilution claim against car manufacturer that invoked its mark in television commercial
designed to suggest that luxury could be affordable); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287
F. Supp. 2d 913, 913, 917 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (declining to enjoin unflattering depiction of
defendant’s bulldozers in movie scene about deforestation); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650
F. Supp. 1166 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (enjoining use of “DOGIVA,” “CATIVA,” and silver foil trade
dress to market high-end pet treats), aff ’d mem., 830 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987).
79. Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure
Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455 (2013); Tushnet, supra note 75.
80. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539-41 (1987); see
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Finally, it is worth noting that the growing expressive power of
corporate reputation comes at a time when the ability of ordinary
people to counter reputational injury is shrinking. The Communica-
tions Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) granted broad immunity from
defamation liability to online intermediaries.81 Congress styled the
CDA as a speech-promoting measure, and it certainly was; early
court decisions in defamation cases against Internet access provid-
ers created a risk of significant liability for an emerging industry
that promised to create unprecedented opportunities for expres-
sion.82 Yet the CDA went further than necessary to shelter that
industry, changing the contours of existing defamation law to
eliminate the risk of distributor liability for intermediaries possess-
ing knowledge of an ongoing harm.83 That change benefited both
new online intermediaries and old media companies that expanded
into the market for Internet services, aligning speech interests with
property interests in a different but no less powerful way.
also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012) (distinguishing S.F. Arts &
Athletics on the ground that the statute at issue there prohibited false invocation of the
Olympic mark for unauthorized material gain); id. at 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“It is well
recognized in trademark law that the proliferation of cheap imitations of luxury goods blurs
the signal given out by the purchasers of the originals.” (quoting William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 308
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 138 (1996) (cod-
ified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 230(c)(1) (2012)).
82. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 1995) (holding a “family oriented” online service liable as publisher of
libelous statements because it exercised some editorial control over the content it served),
superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110
Stat. 56, 138; 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); Robert
Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: Regulating
Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51 (1996). For
representative commentary on the First Amendment implications of defamation liability for
online service providers, see Floyd Abrams, First Amendment Postcards from the Edge of
Cyberspace, 11 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 693 (1996); and Bruce W. Sanford & Michael
J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World, 28
CONN. L. REV. 1137 (1996).
83. See David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications Decency Act? The
Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (2010). For
discussion of the CDA’s sweeping effects on online harassment, see DANIELLE KEATS CITRON,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 170-77 (2014).
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B. Industrial Copyright
The Court in Eldred took the expansionist trajectory of copyright
as an inevitable response to “demographic, economic, and technolog-
ical changes.”84 Authors’ increased longevity, however, might equal-
ly well reinforce the argument that postmortem protection for
copyrights is unnecessary. The purported economic imperative for
longer copyright also was illusory; as the amicus brief of Nobel
Laureate economists demonstrated, the discounted present value of
a twenty-year term extension to authors of works yet to be created
was essentially nil.85 And the Court’s view of technological reality
told only half the story. Property rights may require strengthening
to counter new threats, but the specter of new threats also can be
invoked opportunistically to expand existing entitlements into
uncharted territory. Copyrights are broader and last longer than
ever before, but that result reflects historical contingency and the
assertion of power rather than the demands of materialist logic. 
The one-way ratchet in the scope and duration of copyright
entitlements that has been underway since the mid-twentieth
century has served primarily corporate interests. The dramatic
expansions of copyright in the mid-twentieth century to cover the
byproducts of new recording and broadcast technologies responded
directly to the influence of newly powerful industries. As Jessica
Litman has documented, those industries actively participated in
the drafting of the Copyright Act of 1976, developing a then-novel
process that proceeded via negotiation and compromise among the
affected industries with minimal oversight by elected legislators.86
By the time that process was concluded, the capture of the legisla-
tive process was essentially complete. The resulting legislation
contained broad, general rights and narrow, specific limitations,
eliminating the latitude that formerly had existed for many
nonprofit and downstream uses of copyrighted works.87
84. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206-07 (2003).
85. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5-7,
Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618).
86. See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1987); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L.
REV. 275 (1989).
87. For discussion of the latitude that formerly existed for nonexploitative personal uses,
see Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007).
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The capture of the copyright legislative process has persisted into
the Internet era, producing both continued copyright expansion and
the enactment of new paracopyright regimes such as the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act’s prohibitions against trafficking in tools
for circumventing technical measures applied to copyrighted works.88
Although not every proposal for strengthened protection has
succeeded, that result often reflects the efforts of another group of
powerful interests that includes computer equipment manufacturers
and providers of Internet services. For example, many exceptions to
the antitrafficking provisions benefit those interests, as does the
structure of the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown provisions.89 So too
with copyright litigation: recent years have seen courts begin to
recognize and privilege a wide range of conduct by technology
companies and celebrity artists as fair use, but a parallel re-
calibration to carve out breathing room for creative play and routine
personal use by ordinary people has yet to occur.90 Information and
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b) (2012).
89. See id. § 512, 1201(f) (reverse engineering); id. § 1201(g) (encryption research); id.
§ 1201(j) (security testing). The exceptions benefiting individuals and nonprofit institutions
are far more limited in scope. See id. § 512(b), (h) (immunizing service providers from suits
over mistaken takedowns and allowing suits against complainants only in cases of
“knowing[ ] material[ ] misrepresent[ation]”); id. § 1201(d) (allowing circumvention by
nonprofits, but only if they already know how); id. § 1201(i) (allowing circumvention of
personal profiling capabilities under limited circumstances).
90. See Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 756 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2014)
(reproduction and dissemination by news service of audio recording discussing market
performance); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation by celebrity artist
of documentary artist’s photographs as the basis for a series of artworks); A.V. ex rel.
Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) (reproduction of student papers
for use in automated tool to detect plagiarism); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146
(9th Cir. 2007) (reproduction by an Internet search engine of “thumbnail” versions of
copyrighted photos); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir.
2006) (reproduction of Grateful Dead concert posters in a book about the band); Blanch v.
Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (reproduction by celebrity artist of a commercial
photographer’s work as part of a painting); Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.,
203 F.3d 596, 608 (9th Cir. 2000) (copies of computer software made while reverse engineering
the plaintiff ’s game platform to create a competing platform); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (copies of computer software made while reverse
engineering the plaintiff ’s game platform to create compatible games); Authors Guild, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (reproduction and digitalization of
copyrighted books to permit full-text search), appeal docketed, No. 13-4829 (2d Cir. Dec. 23,
2013). But see Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that
nonprofit libraries’ reproduction and display of digital book scans for purposes of search,
disability access, and preservation was paradigmatic fair use).
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entertainment industry interests also predominate in international
trade negotiations. As a result, and despite its official position to the
contrary, the United States Trade Representative regularly advan-
ces proposals in trade negotiations that go beyond what U.S. copy-
right law would require, and uses its annual Special 301 report to
name and shame countries that have resisted those proposals (or for
other, political reasons).91
Meanwhile, in the legislative arena, the rhetoric has begun to
shift in a way that nakedly acknowledges the real interests at stake.
Industry associations that used to bring individual authors to testify
before Congress now send their own officials, who make arguments
about distribution incentives, trade balances, and gross national
product.92 (The Golan majority cited this too as ineluctable reality.93)
Powerful and well-connected new organizations such as the Copy-
right Alliance boast membership lists consisting of entertainment,
91. For discussion on the uses and abuses of the Special 301 process, see Gabriel J.
Michael, Special 301: Is It Effective?, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS? (June 5, 2014), http://
topromotetheprogress.wordpress.com/2014/06/05/special-301-is-it-effective/ [http://perma.cc/
MCX5-FHN9]; Gabriel J. Michael, Special 301: The Politics of Listings, TO PROMOTE THE
PROGRESS? (June 12, 2014), http://topromotetheprogress.wordpress.com/2014/ 06/12/ special-
301-the-politics-of-listings/ [http://perma.cc/3CBQ-PXXD]. For discussion of industry influence
in trade negotiations, see Margot Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property
Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (2014). For a graphical represen-
tation of the imbalance, see Christopher Ingraham & Howard Schneider, Industry Voices
Dominate the Trade Advisory System, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www. washington
post.com/wp-srv/special/business/trade-advisory-committees/ [http://perma.cc/7H DQ-E8D3]. 
92. Compare The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55-58 (1995) (statements of Bob Dylan, Don Henley, Carlos
Santana, and Stephen Sondheim), and Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing
Musical Compositions; Copyright Term Extension; and Copyright Per Program Licenses:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 27-29 (1997) (statement of Julius Epstein, screenwriter of
“Casablanca”), with The Role of Voluntary Agreements in the U.S. Intellectual Property
System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 12-25 (2013) (statement of Cary Sherman, Chairman
& CEO, Recording Industry Association of America), and Music Licensing Under Title 17:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of David Israelite, President & CEO, National
Music Publishers Association), available at http://perma.cc/DCK7-V3XE.
93. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889 (2012) (“Full compliance with Berne, Congress
had reason to believe, would expand the foreign markets available to U.S. authors and
invigorate protection against piracy of U.S. works abroad, thereby benefitting copyright-
intensive industries stateside and inducing greater investment in the creative process.”
(citation omitted)).
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software, and information industry associations.94 Copyrighted
works may originate as speech by authors, but in the halls of Con-
gress and the corridors of K Street they are big business; they be-
come speech interests again only when legal briefs must be crafted.
C. The Biopolitical Public Domain
The parties in Sorrell argued vigorously about the level of
scrutiny that ought to apply to laws regulating a type of private-
sector information processing that had both privacy and price
implications. None questioned the background default rule that
absent a special reason for protection, personally identifiable
information is there for the taking. That assumption conceals a
distributive decision that is antecedent and profoundly important
to the First Amendment inquiry. Scholarly commentary on Sorrell
has cited the case as evidence of a resurgent Lochnerism because
the majority opinion reorients First Amendment standards toward
the protection of economic liberty.95 The comparison is even more
apt than that reasoning suggests. The conception of economic liberty
that Lochner constitutionalized reflected a particular, contingent
relationship between the private law of contract and economic reg-
ulation that had evolved over the course of the preceding century as
the industrial economy emerged.96 In similar fashion, the conception
of information freedom constitutionalized by Sorrell reflects a
purported baseline that has itself been under construction during
the decades that have witnessed the emergence of the informational
era.
In the United States, the commercial data processing market has
become a multibillion-dollar market that sits at the intersection of
a number of information-era business models. The oldest of those
models is the consumer credit reporting industry, which emerged on
a nationwide scale in the mid-twentieth century, and which has
been sheltered by a federal statutory framework that limits the
94. Members, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE, http://www.copyrightalliance.org/members [http://
perma.cc/DQ7U-N64J] (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
95. See, e.g., Susan Crawford, First Amendment Common Sense, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2343,
2389-91 (2014); Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New
Economy, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2014); Richards, supra note 4.
96. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); see HORWITZ, supra note 66, at 9-31.
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liability of consumer reporting entities and imposes no independent
duty to verify information or reconcile discrepancies between
conflicting reports.97 In the late twentieth century, as automated
reporting and data processing emerged and became commoditized,
credit reporting agencies, credit issuers, and other entities began
developing business models based on mining their databases for
sources of competitive advantage.98 The emergence of the Internet
prompted explosive growth in the number and variety of businesses
that collect, process, and exchange personally identifiable informa-
tion. Today, those businesses include: search providers that seek, as
Google puts it, “to organize the world’s information and make it
universally accessible and useful”;99 web-based social networking
platforms that use graphically rich, hypertext-based environments
to enable customizable member profiles and multimedia exchanges;
and operators of online massively multiplayer gaming platforms.
As companies in these industries have moved beyond the startup
stage and sought stable sources of financing, they have gravitated
toward surveillance-based business models to help them monetize
user activities more completely and effectively.100 Other information
enterprises, including data brokers and developers of so-called
behavioral advertising tools, help to provide such capabilities to all
types of businesses.101 Widespread ownership of networked mobile
devices has enabled real-time tracking of people’s whereabouts
and activities, enabling more precise targeting of offers and oppor-
tunities. The flows of information that support these activities move
97. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2012) (requiring “reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”); id. § 1681h(e) (preempting actions for
defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence except to the extent authorized by the federal
law); id. § 1681n(a) (authorizing statutory damages only for willful noncompliance); Sarver
v. Experian Info. Solutions, 390 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that requirement to
investigate anomalies would be unreasonable “given the enormous volume of information
Experian processes daily”).
98. See OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 95-102 (1993); ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION: THE CONSEQUENCES
OF AMERICA’S ADDICTION TO CREDIT 11-30 (2000). 
99. Company Overview, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/company/ [http://perma.cc/
Q7H4-APSE] (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
100. See MARK ANDREJEVIC, ISPY: SURVEILLANCE AND POWER IN THE INTERACTIVE ERA 93-
134 (2007).
101. For a good overview, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., 112TH
CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER
DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES (Comm. Print 2013).
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in ways that are mostly invisible to ordinary consumers, but they
are omnipresent.
These developments, like the others discussed in this Article, are
manifestations of the transformation now underway in our political
economy, and here it is important to consider some of the conceptual
work that transformation requires. Like the prior transition from
agrarianism to industrialism, the ongoing transition from industri-
alism to informationalism involves the commodification of impor-
tant resources—land, labor, and money then; attributes, prefer-
ences, and attention now.102 The idea of resources available for
commodification in turn entails a very particular idea of the
common as unowned and available. The routine practices of
personal information processing that have become the norm in the
information economy are constituting a new type of public domain:
the biopolitical public domain, a source of presumptively raw
materials that are there for the taking and on which information-
era innovators can build.103 
Like the public domain in intellectual property, the biopolitical
public domain is a legal construct that does normative and distribu-
tive work.104 It functions as a site of legal privilege (and of correla-
tive no-rights for individual consumers) and as a starting point for
the creation of new types of commercial entitlements that benefit
information businesses. Personal information harvested from con-
sumers is collected, processed, and exchanged in ways that become
the basis for proprietary claims based on trade secrecy, which
allegedly inheres in the databases, the algorithms and techniques
used to process the data, and the resulting correlations and
predictions.105 The biopolitical public domain also frames an
approach to knowledge production based on techniques for pattern
102. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS
OF OUR TIME 71-75 (1957).
103. I elaborate the concept of the biopolitical public domain more fully in Cohen, supra
note 70; Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
104. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004) (discussing the public domain as a colonial construct); Cohen,
supra note 52 (discussing the public domain as a spatial construct); Jessica Litman, The
Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) (discussing the public domain as an epistemological
construct).
105. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS BEHIND
MONEY AND INFORMATION 19-25, 82-83, 191-93 (forthcoming 2015).
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identification within very large data sets. Information businesses
use those techniques to make human behaviors and preferences
calculable, predictable, and profitable.106
Lost in this process of expansion and reification is the ability to
comprehend the harms that widespread collection and processing of
personal information might produce. In the lower courts, informa-
tion privacy claims challenging the commercial processing of
personal information have overwhelmingly resulted in dismissal for
failure to allege injury.107 In policy processes and in the media, the
information industries and libertarian tech policy pundits take a
dismissive stance toward information privacy claims, ridiculing
privacy as antiprogressive and its proponents as old-fashioned and
fearful.108 Because Sorrell was not really a case about an informa-
tion privacy regulation, it is not clear what the Court would say to
a case that squarely presented well-developed claims of information
privacy harm. At minimum, however, a more robust theory of harm
likely would support a stronger claim of government interest, which
might affect the Court’s judgment about the extent of tailoring
required for the law to survive. The patterns of legal privilege and
correlative disentitlement coalescing around the biopolitical public
domain and its constituent knowledge practices work to prevent
such recognition from occurring.
106. For descriptions of these practices, see generally ANDREJEVIC, supra note 100;
PASQUALE, supra note 105; and Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1915-18 (2013).
107. For a partial sampling, see In re Google Inc. Cookie Placement Consumer Privacy
Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. 2013); In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No.
11-MD-02264 JSW, 2013 WL 1283236 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); Yunker v. Pandora Media,
No. 11-CV-03113 JSW, 2013 WL 1282980 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013); In re Linkedin User
Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2013); In re Google Inc. Privacy Policy Litig.,
No. C 12-01382 PSG, 2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2012); In re Sony Gaming
Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2012); In re
iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., No.
C 10-5282 RS, 2011 WL 5117164 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2011); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F.
Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011); and see also In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-
LHK, 2014 WL 1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (dismissing on ground of insufficient
commonality among class members).
108. For representative examples, see LARRY DOWNES, A RATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE
PRIVACY “CRISIS” (Cato Inst. Policy Analysis No. 716, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/
DNX3-7X9K; Adam Thierer, The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy
Plan, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/02/ 23/
the-problem-with-obamas-lets-be-more-like-europe-privacy-plan/ [http://perma.cc/9M8Z-
AAFM].
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D. Circuit Breakers in the Net
The Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project opinion took for granted
a conception of dangerous speech inconsistent with its mid-
twentieth-century precedent on sedition and communism but much
more consistent with late-twentieth-century conceptions of online
threats and acceptable responses. Many (though not all) recent
developments in the legal and technical construction of categories
of information contraband reflect private economic imperatives. Of
particular importance, the past two decades have witnessed a deep
and seemingly permanent shift in the nature of copyright enforce-
ment. Twenty years ago, the principal enforcement tool was the civil
infringement lawsuit. Criminal prosecution might supplement civil
litigation in particularly egregious cases, but the Department of
Justice generally preferred to devote its resources to other problems,
and criminal enforcement was relatively rare.109 Today, criminal
enforcement is far more frequent, and both prosecutors and
copyright owners have new and powerful tools for ex ante interdic-
tion at their disposal.110
Over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, Congress amended the
criminal provisions of the federal intellectual property laws nine
times. The amendments expanded the categories of infringing
conduct eligible for criminal penalties, increased the penalties for
criminal copyright infringement and for importation and distribu-
tion of goods bearing counterfeit marks, and gave enforcement
authorities the power to request court orders directing ex parte
seizures of Internet domains that hosted infringing materials.111 In
109. See generally Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 305 (2002).
110. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PRO IP ACT: ANNUAL REPORT FY 2012 (2012),
available at http://perma.cc/J3JH-NNUM; FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PRO IP ACT
ANNUAL REPORT 2012 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/RCT9-YWNG.
111. Copyright Felony Act, Pub. L. No. 102-561, 106 Stat. 4233 (1992) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2012)); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, § 320104, 108 Stat. 1796, 2110-2111 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320 (2012)); Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, §
5, 110 Stat. 1386, 1387 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012)); No Electronic Theft
(NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, § 2, 111 Stat. 2678, 2678-80 (1997) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319A, 2320 (2012)); Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amend-
ments Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-482, § 102, 118 Stat. 3912, 3912-15 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2318 (2012)); Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
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addition, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 established federal
criminal liability for theft of trade secrets.112 On the civil enforce-
ment side, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 established
a new notice-and-takedown procedure directed at online intermedi-
aries and another, less-well-known procedure for securing interdic-
tion of infringing foreign traffic on a site-wide basis.113 At the same
time, litigation-driven expansion in the suite of indirect infringe-
ment theories created the potential for monetary liability on a
hitherto unheard-of scale.114
For some members of the copyright industries, these develop-
ments have not gone far enough. In particular, a litigation campaign
designed to extend indirect infringement liability to reach third-
party payment processors and venture capitalists failed to produce
the desired results.115 In 2011, at the behest of the motion picture,
recording, and major league sports industries, several members of
Congress proposed legislation that would empower courts to cut off
the support services provided by payment processors and other
infrastructure providers upon ex parte application by an aggrieved
109-9, §§ 102-103, 119 Stat. 218, 218-21 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319B
(2012)); Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act, Pub. L. No. 109-181, 120 Stat. 285
(2006) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012)); Prioritizing Resources and Organi-
zation for Intellectual Property Act, Pub. L. No. 110-403, §§ 202-206, 122 Stat. 4256, 4260-63
(2008) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2320, 2323 (2012)); Food and Drug Admini-
stration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, § 717, 126 Stat. 993, 1076-77 (2012)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012)); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 1201-1204, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863-76 (1998) (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 1204 (2012)).
112. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 101, 110 Stat. 3488, 3488-91
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2012)).
113. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2879-80,
2885 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1), (j)(1)(B)(ii) (2012)).
114. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (recognizing theory of
secondary liability based on inducing copyright infringement); Columbia Pictures Indus. v.
Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming summary judgment on contributory infringe-
ment liability for torrent site operator based on finding of sufficient causal connection to
infringement by users of BitTorrent protocol); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643
(7th Cir. 2003) (affirming finding of willful blindness sufficient to support contributory
infringement liability based on design of defendant’s file-sharing platform).
115. See UMG Recordings v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 713 F.3d 1006, 1032 (9th Cir.
2013) (rejecting speculative theory of joint control over web hosting platform by venture
capital investors); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that third-party payment processor lacked required causal connection to infringement and
that right to terminate relationships with hosting sites did not equal right and ability to
control the infringing conduct).
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rightholder.116 The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and its compan-
ion bill, the Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), sparked
vehement protests that culminated in a worldwide Internet blackout
in January 2012.117 Partly in response to the protests and partly in
response to the objections of powerful Internet companies, Congress
tabled the legislation.118
Notably, although the Obama Administration ultimately declined
to support passage of the SOPA/PIPA legislation, its official position
was that strong intervention in the online environment on behalf of
intellectual property owners was entirely consistent with U.S.
solicitude for freedom of speech.119 Well before the SOPA and PIPA
legislation was introduced, however, the federal government had
begun exporting the lessons learned from copyright interdiction to
other domains far removed from intellectual property. In late 2010,
after the news broke that WikiLeaks had leaked a cache of U.S. dip-
lomatic cables that revealed contempt and disrespect for countries
116. See Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong., 1st Sess. (2011);
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property
Act (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (as amended May 26, 2011); SOPA/PIPA: Internet
Blacklist Legislation, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-
censorship-and-copyright-bill [http://perma.cc/79HK-45UD] (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
117. Jonathan Weisman, Web Rises Up to Deflect Bills Seen as Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2012, at A1; David A. Fahrenthold, SOPA Protests Shut Down Web Sites, WASH. POST (Jan.
18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sopa-protests-to-shut-down-web-sites/2012/
01/17/gIQA4WYl6P_story.html [http://perma.cc/S4Z7-QLTE]; Timothy B. Lee, SOPA Protest
by the Numbers: 162M Pageviews, 7 Million Signatures, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012, 1:45
PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/01/sopa-protest-by-the-numbers-162m-pageviews-
7-million-signatures/ [http://perma.cc/V3E9-HFHB].
118. See Jennifer Martinez et al., SOPA’s Surprise Hollywood Ending, POLITICO (Jan. 20,
2012, 9:28 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/71746.html [http://perma.cc/A4N7-
7Q5L].
119. See Letter from Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, to Rep. Howard L. Berman,
(Oct. 25, 2011), available at http://perma.cc/K9LP-SYRA (stating that goals of advancing
Internet freedom and enforcing intellectual property rights online are consistent); Macon
Phillips, Obama Administration Responds to We the People Petition on SOPA and Online
Piracy, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 14, 2012, 8:09 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/
01/14/obama-administration-responds-we-people-petitions-sopa-and-online-piracy
[http://perma.cc/TRS-8Y4A] (“[T]he Administration calls on all sides to work together to pass
sound legislation this year that provides prosecutors and rights holders new legal tools to
combat online piracy originating beyond U.S. borders while staying true to the principles
outlined ... in this response.”); see also Hillary Rodham Clinton, Sec’y of State, Remarks on
Internet Freedom (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/
135519.htm [http://perma.cc/TR2J-P8BS] (“Those who use the internet to ... distribute stolen
intellectual property cannot divorce their online actions from their real world identities.”).
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considered to be U.S. allies, WikiLeaks suddenly found itself with-
out Domain Name System (DNS) and web hosting providers and
without a way to process donations.120 Although government officials
denied that official pressure on EveryDNS.net, Amazon.com, and
PayPal, which formerly had provided those services to WikiLeaks,
caused those sites to terminate their relationships, industry obser-
vers who had watched the developments closely concluded other-
wise.121 
As to the SOPA/PIPA proposal itself, subsequent developments
suggest that the story of the evolution of interdiction capabilities
remains only partly written. The American Bar Association’s Intel-
lectual Property Section recently issued a detailed report outlining
recommendations for implementing strengthened interdiction
obligations.122 Meanwhile, observers of the push to draft new,
comprehensive regional trade agreements strengthening intellectual
property enforcement have worried that the “wall of secrecy”
surrounding the negotiations will enable the SOPA/PIPA prohibi-
tions to resurface in the language of those agreements.123 Whether
or not interdiction obligations are extended, however, the changed
enforcement climate has catalyzed other market reactions. Every
major Internet company that hosts user-provided content uses
automated filtering technology to prevent the posting of infringing
content, and the major Internet access providers have adopted a “six
strikes” menu of graduated sanctions to be levied on customers who
120. Charles Arther & Josh Halliday, WikiLeaks Fights to Stay Online After US Company
Withdraws Domain Name, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2010, 2:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.
com/media/blog/2010/dec/03/wikileaks-knocked-off-net-dns-everydns [http://perma.cc/UM7A-
UBLD] (citing several sources suggesting that EveryDNS.net dropped WikiLeaks under
governmental pressure).
121. Id.; Ashlee Vance, WikiLeaks Struggles to Stay Online after Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 2010, at A8 (noting that Amazon.com kicked WikiLeaks off its systems after inquiries from
an aide to Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman); Bianca Bosker, PayPal Admits State Department
Pressure Caused It to Block WikiLeaks, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2010, 10:17 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/08/paypal-admits-us-state-de_n_793708.html [http://perma.
cc/T6QV-W2QQ].
122. SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, A SECTION WHITE PAPER: A
CALL FOR ACTION FOR ONLINE PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING LEGISLATION (2014), available at
http://perma.cc/9GCY-3D3D. 
123. Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy, Obama’s Covert Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2013,
at A21. For a careful analysis of the draft intellectual property provisions of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership agreement—leaked by WikiLeaks—concluding that the draft does not yet go that
far, see Jonathan Band, The SOPA-TPP Nexus, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 31 (2012).
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they believe are trafficking in infringing materials.124 These and
other measures create an online environment in which proprietary
circuit breakers are expected and ordinary.
* * * 
This Part of the Article has attempted to bring into sharper relief
the background against which contemporary free speech litigation
is conducted. That background reflects a pattern of ongoing realign-
ment in the distribution of legal power and privilege in response to
the asserted needs of powerful actors in the emerging information
economy. Expanding protection for signifiers of corporate reputation
has bolstered the expressive power of capital, and immunity from
legal accountability for speech harms suffered by individuals and
correlative disability on the part of those subjected to such harms
have fortified that power still further. The expressive power of
capital is fortified, as well, by a robust and open-ended privilege to
harvest information from the biopolitical public domain, and by the
corresponding disentitlement of individual information subjects to
decline participation. Intellectual property rights in creative and
expressive works have continued to expand, as have correlative
duties to accommodate them. Last, though hardly least, as rights in
intellectual property and other types of assertedly proprietary
information have expanded, so has the power to demand reconfigu-
ration of the network to protect those entitlements, with correspond-
ing increases in the correlative liability of those who might stand in
the way. Each of these shifts informs the First Amendment
jurisprudence described in Part I. The great intellectual and moral
failing of the contemporary First Amendment, and the impetus for
its ongoing zombification in the service of information power, is that
it has simply accepted them.
124. For information about the graduated response initiative, see CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT
INFORMATION, http://www.copyrightinformation.org/ [http://perma.cc/YX4K-NQ4Q] (last visit-
ed Mar. 20, 2015); and see also Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six
Strikes” Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1 (2012)
(evaluating the initiative in light of norms of fairness and due process).
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CONCLUSION
Constitutional law’s purposes are hotly debated and I have no
grand claims to make on that score; my aim in this Article has been
to draw attention to an emerging pattern. History suggests that
constitutional law has been invoked to reinforce the accumulation
of private economic power at least as often as to restrain it.125 The
account presented here suggests that a transformation of the
former, reactionary sort is underway. For now, at least, First
Amendment law at the dawn of global informational capitalism
is ratifying distributive arrangements that celebrate and consoli-
date private economic power, including especially new forms of
information power that undergird the emerging information econ-
omy. 
Shifting the course of constitutional transformation entails recog-
nition and reframing, and the two processes are linked. Frederick
Schauer has argued that reinvigorating free speech jurisprudence
requires more careful attention to naming and substantiating
speech-related harms.126 That advice is well worth heeding, but in
conceptualizing harms it is also important to focus on who benefits.
It is difficult to assert a speech harm when the counterparty has an
entitlement that seems solidly rooted in the preexisting economic
and social fabric. Reinvigorating free speech jurisprudence for the
information age will entail recognition and reframing of harms, but
it also requires more careful attention to naming and demystifying
emerging patterns of legal power and privilege.
This suggests, however, that legal scholars looking to consti-
tutional law for tools to halt the seemingly inexorable march of
private power probably have been looking in the wrong place. As
many have noted, the Constitution was not designed as a vehicle for
correcting the maldistribution of resources, but rather tends to take
inequality of property as a given. If the hope of a reinvigorated First
Amendment is all that stands between us and the advancing horde
of First Amendment zombies, we are in deep trouble. Questions
about private law and private harms, in contrast, are centrally
125. For some examples, see HORWITZ, supra note 66, at 9-31.
126. Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 96-97.
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about access to and distribution of resources. A jurisprudence of
harms and benefits for the information economy must begin with
those questions.
